Fall of Qin: The Toxic Leader Tango

Toxic leadership promotes personal loyalty at the expense of systemic functioning. That’s why it’s so dangerous (you might almost call it toxic), but also why it keeps appearing and why toxic leaders make it to the top, particularly under certain conditions. (Of particular concern to me is that not only do we see them in corporations and politics but also rising to power in the wake of well-intentioned revolutions against tyranny.) Let’s use the classic account of the fall of Qin as a way of discussing the manner in which toxic leadership causes institutional meltdowns and as a seed for coming up with solutions.

What Is a Toxic Leader?

The US Army says: "Toxic leadership is a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance... Toxic leaders consistently use dysfunctional behaviors to deceive, intimidate, coerce, or unfairly punish others to get what they want for themselves."

What Are Toxic Behaviors?

Forbes Magazine notes that the most common behaviors you may see in toxic leaders or colleagues are:

• Abuse of power

• Nepotism/favoritism

• Overly protective of those who follow them blindly

• Expectation of unquestioned loyalty

• Bullying

• Micromanaging

• Gossiping

• Deception/withholding information/exaggerating problems

• Using fear as a motivating tool

• Incapable of receiving constructive criticism

• Driven by finger-pointing

Why Are Toxic Leaders Bad for Organizations?

 Let’s focus our discussion of why toxic leaders are bad for organizations with a look at the fall of Qin.  The only source of the Qin fall is based on Han Dynasty Historian Sima Qian’s account. We don’t actually know how the Qin came down because Sima Qian is our only source. It would be ideal if there were additional sources, but we do know is that Sima Qian was a senior official who had lived his entire life at the personality dysfunction junction that is the nexus of power of any political system; in his case, a monarchy (or really any political system) and survived a palace purge. His depiction of history advances his own ideas, but if anyone knows about toxic leaders and power struggles, it’s Sima Qian.

The fall of Qin begins with the death of the First Emperor. The First Emperor conquered his traditional rivals for rulership of what would come to be China, stressing society and the treasury with massive building projects. He also seems to have developed something of a cult of personality, but that’s besides our point today. The collapse began when the Emperor fell seriously ill. Sima Qian tells us that the Emperor commanded an official named Zhao Gao, whom Sima Qian casts as his archvillain, to create a document effectively designating his son Fusu as his heir and giving the command of the army to the talented General Meng Tian. However, Zhao Gao, recognizing that keeping this a secret would allow him to play kingmaker, hid the document. Li Si, the Chancellor, feared that revealing the Emperor’s death so far from the Capital would lead to a rebellion, and so conspired with Zhao Gao and the Emperor’s less competent son Huhai to maintain an illusion that the Emperor was still alive as they proceeded back to the capital.

Sima Qian tells us that Zhao Gao concocts the plan to enthrone Huhai instead of Fusu. Zhao Gao convinces a reluctant Huhai with the lure of glory and then convinces Li Si by pointing out the personal danger to Li Si’s career should Fusu ascend the throne.

Thus, they then forge a text repudiating Fusu and accusing General Meng Tian of negligence, requiring both to commit suicide.

The treatment of Fusu and Meng Tian aroused disatisfaction if not outright suspicion. Huhai went to Zhao Gao for advice on dealing with the situation and Zhao Gao recommended violence, purging not simply potential opponents to Huhai’s reign but those not specifically loyal to Zhao Gao as well as taking the time to avenge slights to his person. These purges did absolutely nothing to deal with rebellions that began almost as soon as the Second Emperor ascended the throne.

A pair of commanders, Chen She and Wu Guang, were delayed by heavy rains while leading a column of troops. As missing a check-in was a capital crime (misdirected troops being a cause for concern), Chen She and Wu Guang reasoned that they had nothing to lose by actually rebelling. They captured territory and Chen She declared himself King of Chen (an area in modern Hunan and Anhui), while Wu Guang also declared himself king and pushed westward to claim a domain. Huhai (or Zhao Gao) is said to have punished messengers bringing him news of this revolt, meaning that he soon was under a self-imposed news blackout. Even as the purges in the capital continued and Zhao Gao sought to shore up loyalty to himself, rebellion spread. One of Chen She’s generals marched north, and seeing success, declared himself King of Zhao, while a number of other local rebellions across the Empire began within the Second Emperor’s first year.

The Emperor’s pattern of behavior- isolating himself from bad news seems to have been part of a general pattern of behavior spurred on by Li Si and Zhao Gao, each in their own way and for their own reasons. Li Si feared that the unreasonable expectations of an incompetent Emperor amidst catastrophe would see him lose his position. Citing Shen Buhai and Han Feizi, philosophers whose works focused on management and power, he suggested the emperor collect all power around his person and observe and punish his ministers so as to maintain control. This distance would help prevent the Second Emperor’s ministers from manipulating him. Doubtlessly, Li Si intended to position himself as the only source of guidance the Second Emperor could trust.**

However, Zhao Gao gave similar advice, but in keeping with their characters, Zhao Gao’s advice was entirely based in self-interest, emphasizing the singular position of the king above his ministers.

Zhao Gao, often understood to have been a Eunuch, controlled access to the Emperor’s person and so when Li Si attempted to bring matters of state to the Emperor’s attention, such as the worsening crisis of rebellion, Zhao Gao, while pretending to help Li Si, always arranged to have Li Si arrive as the Emperor was relaxing, thus angering the Emperor. At this point, Li Si either denounced Zhao Gao in a letter or Li Si and two other high officials attempted to remonstrate the Emperor. Either way, the Emperor turned to Zhao Gao and had them arrested and executed. Zhao Gao was made Chancellor. At this point, ca. 208, the Emperor finally dispatched an army to deal with rebels and while the force defeated one leader, it was too little, too late; Liu Bang, who would go on to found the Han, and his rival, Xiang Yu were already running rampant.

Meanwhile, Zhao Gao consolidated his hold on the Imperial Court. A revealing anecdote goes as follows:

On the Jihai Day of the 8th Month (of the third year of the Second Emperor’s reign), Zhao Gao was considering treachery but was worried he lacked support so he decided to test them first. He brought a picture of a deer to the Emperor saying “Look at this horse.” The Emperor laughed, saying “Surely you’re mistaken, what you’ve called a horse is a deer.” They asked the ministers. Some were silent, some said it was a deer to go along with Zhao Gao. Zhao Gao secretly arranged for the arrest and execution of those who said it was a deer and afterwards, the ministers all feared him.

Zhao Gao then engineered the death of the Second Emperor. Taking control of the remaining government, he told them what he had done and then acknowledged that the Empire was lost, and that Qin must revert to being a kingdom to salvage what was left and suggested they appointed a king. The appointee, Ziying is said to have been a frugal and humane man that would likely have appealed to the general population of Qin, and while Zhao Gao doubtlessly hoped to control him as he had the Second Emperor, Ziying did not trust Zhao Gao and had him killed and his family exterminated. However, it was all far too late. Ziying lasted 46 days before Liu Bang arrived.

What Can We Learn?

Is Quia’s depiction dramatized? Absolutely? Is Qin demonized? Naturally. Are the presentations of character naturalistic and authentic to court politics? Without a doubt.* Yet, we can still draw meaningful observations from this work. 

Firstly, Li Si and particularly Zhao Gao were concerned first and foremost about their personal benefit over that of the realm. While Li Si had principles, he was easily swayed and his suggestion of absolute monarchy simply made things worse. This stands in stark contrast to the presentation of Liu Bang and his establishment of the Han, where even the earliest propagandists emphasized the coalition nature of the administration and an emperor who ruled in consultation with good advisors.

Zhao Gao had no principles.

In both cases, their need for personal loyalty above loyalty to the state, as well as the need to maintain the favor of the Emperor meant that they were strongly incentivized to sabotage rivals, particularly when those rivals had sound advice. If it couldn’t be controlled by them, then it was a threat to their position.

Similarly, the Second Emperor took criticism as a threat, meaning that he cut himself off from advice and information. The rebellions could have been dealt with swiftly, but the purges in the bureaucracy and general systemic malfunction prevented information from flowing and effective actions from being taken.

In short, the need for absolute control resulted in an inability to function.

How Does This Relate to Recent Governments? 

In both World War II and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Stalin and Putin, respectively have had felt the need to rotate successful generals lest these figures develop a following and become rivals to their power. Underlings are incentivized to do the same, lest they find themselves replaced by a skilled underling. The result leaches efficiency from the system. In parallel, the need to display loyalty by agreeing that the deer is, in fact, a horse, means that the council room becomes an echo chamber. Advisors cannot give sound advice because bad news risks being understood as criticism and disloyalty, hence the impaired decision making and poor reaction time of Hitler’s, Stalin’s, and Putin’s war plans, and Mao’s economic policies.

In contemporary China, we’re seeing similar forms of administrative gridlock as Xi’s regime emphasizes party control as the driving factor for success. Because advancement in the government and indeed, survival, depends on maintaining the favor of the party hierarchy, bureaucrats are not simply afraid to deviate from orders, they are often afraid to implement orders lest they cause a problem, particularly when orders come in the form of quotas to be met. According to research by Jessica Teets, administrators are not simply willing to carry out orders that they know will hurt people, they oscillate between inaction and overaction as they attempt to conceal problems they are aware of and then appear effective by meeting their quotas.

We also see a tendency to pursue personal agendas of avenging percieved and real personal slights. Just as Zhao Gao used state action to engage in personal vendettas, we see similar actions on the parts of toxic leaders. A good example right now is Trump’s spat with Harvard, where he is trying to stop foreign enrollment and redistribute grant money to be directed to Harvard to other institutions.

A further feature of bad government seen only faintly in Sima Qian, but well known elsewhere is the cult of personality. We will discuss the psychology of the cult of personality and parasocial relationships elsewhere, but one thing that’s worth noting is that cult of personality and the attempt of a leader to make themselves indispensable is something we also often see as part of a strategy to ensure loyalty to their person.

Does This Relate to Business?

What’s interesting and concerning here is that we can see parallels in the world of business. Let’s consider the phenomenon of celebrity business leaders. Steve Jobs, for example, was booted from Apple in 1985 following a prolonged power struggle with the leadership. When he returned in 1997, his personal presence at preview meetings became a fixture and a means of branding Apple. Apple without Steve Jobs became unthinkable. To be clear, I’m not saying Steve Jobs was a toxic leader, I don’t know enough about him. He clearly was an expert inventor who reimagined computer User Interfaces twice. However, his role in the tech industry, not simply helped protect him from being removed from power again, it set a precedent.

Steve Jobs was Apple., a case of a brilliant inventor with a company that produced his ideas. But let’s look at the way things have developed since then. A number of CEOs such as Elon Musk (Tesla) and Jensen Huang (NVIDIA) have tried to make themselves the face of their companies. Now, Jensen Huang really is a chip designer. Is he a visionary? Meh. But he’s at least an expert in what his company does. Musk, however, bought a start-up and is a businessman, not an engineer. Despite this, he is the face of Tesla trade-shows and presents concept cars as though they were the next IPhone. The difference is that concept cars seldom get put into production, they just build hype, hype which increases stock price. What all of this means is that personal image and the person of the leader is becoming increasingly tightly intertwined in businesses. This will incentivize precisely the sorts of behaviors we have seen in Qin as leaders seek to maintain their personal prestige and underlings seek to gain their favor.

Indeed, we have already seen indications of such behavior even in companies with faceless boards of directors, such as Ford’s attempts to hush up the Ford Pinto’s exploding gas tanks, Enron’s business trouble (would you believe they now want us to let them run nuclear plants?), and Boeing’s quality control issues.

The Take-Away

Toxic leadership strategies undermine their organizations for the personal interests of leaders. There are numerous examples throughout history and we must learn from them by examining them to devise ways to organize better governments and companies otherwise it will be society at large who will continue to pay the price. In the future, I will return to this topic using this as a point of reference, but preliminarily, it seems that effective bureaucracy and diverse, open selectorates can help mitigate this, but I think serious discussion is required on the matter. We need ways of keeping toxic leaders out of positions of power and the more stratified and hierarchical a society it is, the greater the damage they can do.

* I can expand on this, but for now, simply accept that there’s reason to trust the picture and nature of interactions if not all the details.

**This advice, while questionable in the situation, is actually grounded in Han Feizi and Shen Buhai’s works, but Sima Qian’s critique of their ideas through the hermeneutics of history is beyond the scope of this post.